

















































What is Moving Right Now?
Elton Marques 
LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon
This paper suggests an answer to a rarely approached 
question on the model known as the Moving Spotlight 
Theory (MST). Its advantage lies in that it adds to the 
debate a clear view of the kind of nature that might 
correspond to the ‘moving spotlight’ responsible for 
the passage of time. More specifically, our theory indi-
cates clearly what kind of thing about which the mod-
el’s spotlight can tell us. The paper’s main goal is not 
the defense of the moving spotlight as a theory itself, 
but an approach for understanding the metaphor at 
the core of this theory. To achieve our purpose, we 
bring to the main thesis and promote the union of two 
components: a) the present is the awareness of our 
mental states and b) the flow of our awareness or our 
mental states should correspond to the passage of 
time and to the spotlight itself. We hope to indicate 
what is required to correspond to the “spotlight” in an 
illuminating way and address anticipated difficulties.
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I. A Moving Spotlight
Before facing the challenges that we impose on this article, it is first necessary to ex-
plain the theory with which we struggle: the “Moving Spotlight Theory” (henceforth 
MST). MST emerged following a metaphor coined by C. D. Broad (1923):
We are naturally tempted to regard the history of the world as existing eternally in a certain 
order of events. Along this, and in a fixed direction, we imagine the characteristic of present-
ness as moving, somewhat like the spot of light form a policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the 
fronts of the houses in a street. What is illuminated is the present, what has been illuminated 
is the past, and what has not yet been illuminated is the future (59).
According with the metaphor, a spotlight illuminating the present moves in uninter-
rupted fashion, travelling across space-time. Its theoretical advantage lies in that it 
can make the passage of time compatible with an eternalist ontology, which is typ-
ically tenseless. In this section, we present that model 
by discussing relevant aspects of its definition. 1 One 
way of presenting the model is by discussing it in re-
lation to the theses it accommodates. Such theses cor-
respond to the desire for a tenseless ontology, but also 
make it compatible with the McTaggartian A- theory 
of time. Those theses are, respectively, eternalism (or 
permanentism), and the thesis that time passes, usu-
ally referred to as the A-series. Permanentism 2 is, ac-
cording to Deasy, the thesis that: «it is always the case 
that everything exists eternally» (Deasy 2015, 2074). 3 
Eternalism is the thesis in which there exist non-present 
objects, facts, times, relations and events. According to 
eternalists, the difference between future or past things 
and present things is not that the former does not exist. This thesis contrasts with 
presentism, which makes the opposite claims. In Sider’s classic formulation, «a pre-
sentist thinks that everything is present; more generally, that, necessarily, it is always 
true that everything is (then) present» (1999, 326). According to the same author, 
«eternalism states that “there are such things as merely 
past and future entities”» (1999, 326). 4 Permanentism 
and eternalism are most commonly associated with 
B-theories of time. Their proponents usually deny that 
anything is an absolute and non-relative present, while 
presentism 5 and transientism 6 are doctrines typical-
ly associated with A-theories. The so-called “A-series 
theory” of time has different definitions in the litera-
ture. Deasy (2015), for example, defines it as a theory in 
which an instance of time is an absolute and non-rela-
tive present. 7
In the McTaggartian approach, A-series refers 
to a description of time as events ordered according to 
the property of being future, present or past. This char-
acterisation contrasts with B-series theories of time, in 
which points in time are ordered relatively as “being 
anterior, posterior, or simultaneously” to or with each 
1 The use of ‘model’ to refer to the-
ories like MST is not uncommon; 
however, we should clarify how we 
use that word here. We use ‘model’ 
to indicate theories that provide a 
picture of the world, or an image 
that clarifies an aspect of what we 
are inquiring in our investigation.
2 Williamson (2013, 4) coined 
the term ‘permanentism’ 
to describe this thesis.
3 Formally:  
A∀xA∃y y = x (cf. Deasy 2015).
4There are many different formu-
lations of this thesis in the lit-
erature. Trenton Merricks, for 
instance, uses a different strat-
egy, in terms of the existence of 
‘times’ (2006:103). To A slightly opi-
nionated introduction of different 
formulations, see Fischer (2016).
5 In a more rigorous manner, pre-
sentism is true if and only if the 
more unrestricted domain of 
our quantifiers consists only of 
present objects and events.
6 Transientism is the thesis 
according to which there are 
things that start to exist and 
things that cease to exist (cf. 
Deasy 2015). Formally: S(∃xP 
¬∃y y = x) & S(∃xF ¬∃y y = x)).






























































other. Before moving on to characterise the MST model, we would like to discuss 
the theses of permanentism and eternalism, since these are relevant parts of dif-
ferent definitions in the extant literature. While Deasy (2015), for instance, propos-
es MST as a model that binds the A-series to permanentism, other authors, like Sider 
(2001) and Cameron Ross (2015), focus the theory on 
eternalism only. 8 What is the relationship between per-
manentism and eternalism? We ought to consider their 
relationship as follows: all permanentists are eternal-
ists, but only some eternalists are permanentists. 9 Can 
there be non-eternalist permanentism and non- per-
manentist eternalism? We may experience great diffi-
culty in professing a presentist permanentism, at least 
in a way that makes it sounds appealing. We think it 
does not fit well with our intuition of a temporal life 
that includes, for instance, different parts, i.e., days, ages, 
objects that change, etc. 10 Non-permanentist eternal-
ism seems, however, more appealing for the simple rea-
son that there is nothing inconsistent in the idea of an 
eternalist world that was, nonetheless, created by God. 
The opposite would be to impose a limit on creation: as 
long as there is a creative act at the origin of the world, 
the latter could not be, for instance, an eternalist one. 
However, that is a theological cost that no one should 
impose on any doctrine, at least not without a better 
reason than merely that of associating doctrines that 
are differently defined. Because of this, it is difficult to 
make permanentism and God’s creation compatible; 
non- permanentist eternalism has a lower theological 
price, and we do have a reason to think that eternalism 
shall not be considered as a theory committed with per-
manentism. Naturally, any model that is permanentist 
and compatible with the A-series can be characterised 
as corresponding to MST, independent of whether it is 
eternalist or not.
Here, then, is how one could characterise MST, 
considering the additional clause that permanentism 
and eternalism may both be part of the definition: MST 
is true if, and only if, permanentism or eternalism is true, 
and some instant of time is a non-relative, absolute 
present. 11 This definition 12 bears the novelty of intro-
ducing a disjunction between permanentism and eter-
nalism, which can only mean that both theses are indi-
vidually sufficient for any MST model. The sense of this 
addition lies in considering the thesis that some vari-
ants of eternalism are not permanentist and can even 
themselves be part of an MST model. The disjunction 
“eternalism or permanentism” might not offer an ad-
vantage over Deasy’s formulation. However, it captures 
aspects of the model that we think we should have in 
mind: a) the definition in terms of “eternalism” is not 
8 Williamson (2002, 2013) has pro-
posed a version of MST, or a model 
closely related to Broad's the-
ory. The main question of this 
paper might not apply to models 
like Williamson’s MST. That is the 
case because the model inspired 
by Williamson’s theory of modal-
ity accepts that all fundamen-
tal facts are temporal, which leads 
to the view that temporal opera-
tors are fundamental as well. So, 
it might not call for an explana-
tion of ‘temporal facts’. Adepts 
of classical MST could resist 
explaining ‘presentness’, as we 
try to do in this paper. Here, we 
intend to present a version of 
MST that resembles the model 
coined by Skow (2015), which was 
inspired by Fine‘s fragmentalism.
9 Correa and Rosenkranz also 
seem to consider eternalism under 
the permanentism (2018,:16), and 
Deasy (2019) suggests that pre-
sentism is a transientist ontology. 
Our thesis extends the same con-
sideration to theories that oppose 
presentism and transientism, i.e., 
permanentism and eternalism. The 
reason would be straightforward, 
indeed: if everything that exists is 
eternal, so the past (or what we 
call ‘past’) has always exist eter-
nally, because we have the expe-
rience of it many times, and the 
future (or what we call a ‘future’), 
since we have the experience 
of things changing many times, 
which has always existed as well.
10 Despite our claims, Julian 
Barbour (1999) has been iden-
tified as a possible defender of 
static presentism, or if you like, 
a defender of what we might call 
‘Parmenidic presentism’. Perhaps 
this could be counted as a ver-
sion of presentist permanentism.
11 This is a version of Deasy’s 
(2015) definition, which includes 
eternalism. Indeed, we think eter-
nalism plus A-series would be suf-
ficient for MST, and eternalism and 
permanentism could be separate.
12 For a more content-focused 
characterization, take for instance 
a description by Fischer: «accord-
ing to the moving spotlight the-
ory, the present is like a spotlight 
(hence the name) which “sheds its 
light” on the present point in time. 
It moves (yes!) alongside the time-
line, thus always rendering a dif-





























































less common, b) eternalism is sufficient for MST as a primitive thesis, and c) it seems 
untrue that all eternalist model is a permanentist one. With this picture in mind, after 
considering all we have, we can now ask properly: what is the spotlight that “shed its 
light” if anything? What could its nature be? How can we explain it as a metaphor? 
The typical motivation for a proponent of MST is to make compatible opposite the-
ses: 1) time passes, having an objective absolute present and 2) the correct ontology 
is not presentist, i.e., it is that which includes in the most unrestricted domain of our 
quantifiers present as well as past and future entities. Considering all this, the reasons 
to be an eternalist are also reasons to prefer MST over other A-series pictures of the 
world: for example, arguments taking the relativity of simultaneity seriously (Rietdjik 
1966; Putnam 1967; Penrose 1989; Petkov 2006); arguments in terms of “truthmak-
ers” and the “grounding” version of this challenge (Rea 2006); considerations in fa-
vour of Minkowskian space-time; and the difficulties of causal relations between 
presents and non-present facts. The reasons for accepting MST, besides the classical 
block universe, are related to two strong intuitions: time passes, and there is some-
thing special about the present. Anyone who wishes to deny presentism while assert-
ing the passage of time will find in that model an obvious source of interest. Given 
the high number of eternalists who are embarrassed by the difficulties involved in 
the idea that time passes and has a direction, we should 
wonder why that model is not more appealing. 13 In this 
paper, we hope to help to make sense of the metaphor 
that this theory embraces. We think that at least some 
adepts of MST will find it appealing to have something 
to indicate as a ground for understanding Broad’s orig-
inal metaphor.
II. A Metaphor to Be Understood and Exemplified
Why do we need to make sense of the metaphor in the first place? There are sever-
al characterisations of MST without any explanatory account of it: why not just ac-
cept the official formulations? In Relativity and the Moving Spotlight, for instance, 
Skow (2009) is quite explicit about metaphors in the context of MST: they may be 
helpful for illustrative purposes only. The whole point of metaphors is that they are 
easily understood. If being understood includes being identifiable, the metaphor of 
the spotlight does not seem sufficiently explanatory. As it happens, this might be 
the reason why Broad sought to reject it (or at least part of the reason). We suppose 
Broad did not imagine what could truly be elucidated by the passage of the spotlight 
if we do not know what the spotlight is. 14 It seems clear 
that the spotlight, to the extent in which it illuminates 
events in the world, must itself be an event in this world 
(Broad 1923, 60). If we say what is normally said, i.e., 
that the metaphor is too basic to explain, then we are 
enwrapped in the following circularity: the spotlight in-
dicates a mutable present which, in turn, is the spotlight. 
The metaphor remains hollow, imprecise and non-ex-
planatory. Answering the question posed by the paper 
amounts to offering a thesis on what the mutable pres-
ent is, a thesis still absent from the literature. One important point to mention is that 
to conceive an explanatory account of “what is moving right now” does not depend 
on offering good reasons to accept MST as a model. Of course, if MST is false and the 
13 Deasy (2015) considers the 
unpopularity of that model a 
result of the unappealing way in 
which it has been defined, as, 
for instance, in Sider (2001).
14 In this paper, we assume that 
philosophers may be more sym-
pathetic to the idea of taking the 
metaphor seriously and consider 
that it deserves a more explana-
tory account. We think that even 
classical spotlighters would 
enjoy the main question of this 
paper: does the moving spot-
light correspond to something 





























































world is otherwise a block universe, our point would be empty, but it would not be 
invalid so much as it will shed light on the classical metaphor, which is our purpose 
here. Moreover, we assume that MST is an interesting account about time and that 
many defenses of this are sufficient to assume this model as a starting point. We as-
sume as well that the question about what could refer to the classical metaphor in 
Broad’s model is interesting in and of itself and that many philosophers might have 
the same interest in exploring possible answers to this 
quandary. 15 We are convinced that any attempted an-
swer must indicate a real change. There is a clear sense 
in which things change, even in a standard block uni-
verse; 16 a qualitative change in time, i.e., in t1, x has the 
property p, but in t2, x does not have the same proper-
ty. However, that sense raises questions about its legit-
imacy. Geach (1972) expressed it well when he wrote 
the following:
On this view, the variation of a poker’s temperature with time would simply mean that there 
were different temperatures at different positions along the poker’s time axis. But this [...] 
would no more be a change in temperature than a variation in temperature along a poker’s 
length would be [...] We thus have a view that really abolishes change, by reducing change to 
a mere variation of attributes between different parts of a whole. (304-305)
Let us then undertake this methodological point: we want the spotlight to corre-
spond to a change that is more than just a qualitative change in the sense of Geach’s 
critique. That will be the beginning of our quest: How to find something changing 
that may correspond to the spotlight, in the world? Our mental states change. Could 
our mental states be responsible for the changes we indicate? Against that thesis, the 
proponent of a traditional block universe could claim that the changes in our mental 
states do not satisfy the above criterion, for all our mental states are somehow re-
lated with the non-present temporal parts of our non-present brains. The resulting 
change in our mental states would thus be that which we avert, by methodological 
principle, i.e., to present only different properties in different temporal parts. It seems 
to us that this hypothetical objector would be correct.The answer we are looking for, 
meanwhile, becomes closer. It is not our mental states that answer to the spotlight 
but our awareness of our mental states. What the proponent of the block universe 
says about our mental states is true: in a block universe, or any other eternalist mod-
el, our mental states must correspond to the states of affairs on which they depend, 
i.e., some future event must be connected with some corresponding mental state, of 
which the latter would, at least partly, be its cause. 17 
However, the same does not apply in any way when it 
comes to our awareness of our mental states. We are 
aware of our present mental states, and the states of 
which we are aware, at least in the relevant sense to 
our purpose, are always present ones. Such a thesis resemble the one proposed by 
Braddon-Mitchell in 2004.
In the model known as the growing block model, it relates the present, to 
our conscious and dynamic mental states. Here, the same thesis can be defended 
against the arguments the author himself has made in his rejection of it. For now, 
we should simply clarify what is meant in that thesis. Let us bring to light a princi-
ple of which to make use, which we might call ‘I now principle’. The “I now principle” 
15 To defenses of MST, see 
for instance Deasy (2015) 
and Ross Cameron (2015).
16 The block universe refers to 
eternalist models compatible 
with B-series, in which events 
are organized according to rela-
tionships of simultaneity, suc-
cession and anteriority. In this 
model, time does not pass.
17 For instance, the act of break-
ing or smashing a window may 
be related to certain mental 





























































can be stated thus: df: we are always aware of our present mental states, and only of 
those. How can we defend the truth of that principle? We can answer this by elimina-
tion. The rival hypothesis would hold that we are aware of our future (or past) men-
tal states. However, it is frankly absurd and would not 
be defended by any eternalist (or non-eternalist). 18 It is 
true that, in the future, when we will be aware of a cor-
responding mental state, we shall be living in the pres-
ent and only in it. It is still true that, in the future, we 
will be aware of our mental states that, today, are in the 
future. 19
Thus, the present corresponds to the instant 
t in which we are aware of our mental states. We are 
aware of writing, and of the mental states that cor-
respond to that action. We now feel a very slight pain 
in our throat; we are aware of it. The mental state of 
which we are aware is the pain, however mild, and it is 
present. Tomorrow we may feel great joy in walking through the streets of Paris, the 
city where we are. Now, certainly, if the eternalist picture of the world is the most ac-
curate, the mental states relative to non-present events must correspond to the past 
or the future, themselves existing. Our thesis is committed to the existence of tense-
less non-conscious mental states. On the tenseless existence of something, wheth-
er or not it is true, there is nothing to discuss, because it is an acknowledged part 
of any version of MST. However, the thesis that we can have non-conscious mental 
states draws little support, and we must say something about it. Can there truly be 
non-conscious mental states? This question is important because we should have a 
difference between present and non-present times. We shall consider, according to 
our model, just the present mental states as we are aware of them, and that is the dif-
ference upon which we wish to remark. Nevertheless, to be sure, many non-present 
mental states should be available to us, according to our model.
Searle, for instance, extends the scope of the mental to the non-conscious, 
including non-felt mental states, derived in the brain. His idea was to characterize 
mental states as states where consciousness might or might not reside. Mental states 
are the only candidates for consciousness (Searle 1997, 232). However, some men-
tal states, such as unconscious states, will be purely neurophysiological phenome-
na, over which we have no control or emotion. These will be non-felt mental states. 
Supposedly, the future and past temporal parts of our brains have associated chem-
istry; they are functional brains, that had or did not have the device of conscious-
ness. However, the only conscious mental states will be those about which we are 
in some way aware, now. We believe it is quite reasonable to restrict awareness of 
those mental states to the present. Our thesis attributes to those mental states the 
existence of the present, as well as temporality itself. 20 
The idea that our consciousness moves or flows while 
the universe is eternalistic is not new, and we question 
why we should associate it with the spotlight. The an-
swer is straightforward: because it helps to make sense 
of the metaphor in MST. Indeed, the thesis that the “con-
science flows” has everything we need: namely, it indi-
cates a passage of time, in the correct direction, and a 
change in a more robust sense. It is also phenomenolog-
ically adequate, i.e., it helps us to make sense of the idea that we live temporal lives, 
18 Eternalists and non-eternal-
ists would diverge on the exist-
ence of non-present men-
tal states. An eternalist should 
say «yes», a presentist should 
not allow for any of them.
19 In fact, we believe that being 
able to accommodate conscious 
mental states far more intelligi-
bly is an advantage of MST rel-
ative to the block universe. Our 
answer is simply to relate the prop-
erty of being present with the prop-
erty of being aware of something.
20 Naturally, the thesis that we 
can have non-conscious mental 
states is not accepted by all, and 
it depends on how we define the 
mental, especially mental states. 
If we define mental states as sub-
jective and private events, as does 
Ceel (1980), for example, we may 





























































even in an eternalist world. So, for those interested in interpreting the MST metaphor 
as non-primitive, i.e., as something to explain, this is a promising idea.
All that conspires with a reasonable principle, the “I now principle”, and nur-
tures the thesis we wish to defend. The spotlight is an aspect of our mental life, re-
lated to our present mental states, which are present because we are aware of them. 
Ultimately, where time is concerned, MST meets ideal-
ism. 21 Naturally, that raises problems. And that is what 
we are going to tackle next.
III. Problems with Our Solution
We aim to propose an answer, which accounts for the 
passage of time, to the question “what is the spot-
light?” Surely, the association of the present with our 
conscious mental states, the only ones of which we are 
aware, does not gather consensus. Worse than that, it 
is polemic and objectionable for reasons we anticipate. 
Some of these are partly directed at similar models, 
such as MST-Time, a Skow’s model (2015) inspired by 
Kit Fine’s fragmentalism (2005). As a version of Skow’s model, it has many different 
present parts inside of a fragmentary world. Others, in turn, are directed at this pa-
per’s original insight: the present and the experience of the present are the same. The 
objections that target our version or that apply to it will carry out their offensive on 
two fronts: they will either object to the idea of relating the present and conscious-
ness, as we do; or they will object to the idea that our model can be classified as a ver-
sion of Broad’s MST theory. Finally, we shall try to compare our thesis with hypotheti-
cal rival theses that offer potential answers to the same question: a) that the spotlight 
corresponds to a supertime identified with God’s conscious mental states and b) that 
the spotlight is related to the second law of thermodynamics, i.e., the present, and, 
consequently, the spotlight would somehow be related to the entropy of systems.
III.1. Why Not Just Accept the Metaphor Without Further 
Explanation?
We shall consider the simple idea that the spotlight is an ontological basic, as a di-
vergent opinion that fits much more with classical adepts of MST. If the spotlight is 
somehow basic, it needs no further explanation at all. The passage of time would be 
a property more likely to have mass or size, i.e., a basic fact about the world. We think 
the very point of having a metaphor is to elucidate something. Of course, one could 
think about it as a basic fact, and it would remain an interesting proposal. However, if 
we share with Broad some of the negative considerations of his theory, perhaps we 
can elucidate it a bit more. In defense of our theory, we manage to avoid the circu-
larity that we stated above: the spotlight indicates a mutable present which, in turn, 
is the spotlight. In our proposal, it might still be a basic ontological fact: what is basic 
now is the awareness of our mental states, without the above circularity.
III.2. How Strange Would it Be as a MST Model?
The next objection simply punctuates the impossibility of making our answer ad-
equate as a version of MST. The MST has been defined as the union of theses like 
21 Idealism on time, of which Kant 
(1781/87) is perhaps the most prom-
inent defender, specifies time and 
temporal properties (to be past, 
present or future) as mind-depend-
ent properties, i.e., dependent on 
a cognitive agent. The eternalist 
models, in general, are compatible 
with that thesis, while classic MST, 
even though it is eternalist, is not, 
prima facie. The present and the 
passage of time, in a classic MST, 
have no relation of dependence of 
our conscious minds. This paper 
aims to reestablish idealism within 
the MST model, even if we thereby 





























































eternalism with the McTaggartian A-series. The A-series, meanwhile, have been de-
fined as theses that postulate one, and only one, absolute present. Without the unique-
ness of the present, we do not envision a similar model. We defend the fact that our 
model is a version of MST for two reasons in particular: a) despite not contemplating 
a unique present it postulates an objective and absolute present time - in an impor-
tant sense to the MST; b) a distinctive trait of all MST, the passage of time, is contem-
plated and exemplified in our model. Perhaps we should clarify in what sense there is 
and in what sense there is not an absolute present in our theory. It is because the the-
ory lacks the uniqueness of the present, i.e., we could not have the same present al-
ways and also do not have an independent present, i.e., in this model, the ‘presentness’ 
is always relative to our awareness of our mental states. But of course, the present 
is absolute in another sense, since we can identify the present with something and 
agree about it, i.e., there is, in our model, just one present time for real, the one that 
correspond to our awareness on our mental states. We believe that this is the sense 
that matters to someone that wishes to adopt a version of MST, and we think that be-
ing aware of our mental states put us in a position to know what ‘the present’ is. This 
consideration follows from the identification of ‘being in the absolute present‘ with 
‘being aware of our mental states’.
Though it is quite possible to have different objective presents on different 
planes of simultaneity, especially for relativistic reasons, in practice, our subjective 
mental states include the perception of simultaneous events, with differences that 
the theory of relativity does not acknowledge as significant. The difference between 
two events, A and B, which are both simultaneous in our coordinate system and not 
simultaneous in the reader’s, is close to zero. This difference exists because the speed 
with which we move relative to others is irrelevant when considering the relativi-
ty of simultaneity, the contraction of space and dilation of time. The relativistic ef-
fects would become part of our life only if we could move at very high speeds, close 
to the speed of light. That contributes to our characterisation of the present as objec-
tive, despite not being absolute as we explained it, i.e., an ontological, unique, and in-
dependent phenomena. The passage of time occurs when one becomes conscious of 
the mental states related to chemical processes in the brain in a causally determined 
structure. That trace of the objective present belongs to a philosophical wager we 
take: an unique present is not required, but only makes room for the intuition that 
time passes. Furthermore, it is no longer agreed upon among authors that no MST 
model can contemplate more than one present, and, thus, more than one spotlight. 
For some developments on these models, we could draw on Skow (2015), in addition 
to Torrengo and Spolaore (2019). The latter authors consider a model they dub the 
double moving spotlight, which they defend persuasively against objections of incon-
sistency. It also seems that the correctness of those hypotheses reveals that we are 
correct in what we considering as requisites to conceive an MST model type.
One could also wonder whether or not the passage of time, as a mind-de-
pendent phenomenon, would be an objective aspect of the world. We believe that the 
negative answer is false. The equivocation consists of identifying subjective aspects 
with illusions, i.e., that whatever is subjective must be non-objective, like a cognitive 
illusion. However, since our mental states, from which our consciousness somehow 
emerges, are aspects of our mental life, we can challenge the tacit identification be-
tween what is subjective and what is not objective. Everything that is part of the 
world is, whether or not it is a mental phenomenon, an objective aspect to which we 





























































III.3. The Presentness is Mind Depend?
There is a possible objection to the idea that the present can be mental. In our model, 
the present is mental, but not only: the passage of time is a mind-dependent phenom-
enon too. However, if there are no minds, there are no temporal properties whatso-
ever. This objection merely presumes that it is unacceptable that temporality should 
be associated with a mental phenomenon. However, we should rather ask why this 
is unacceptable. We could simply reply: yes, time is ideal, as philosophers like Kant 
(1781/87) claim. If this is true, then so is the property of being present. With no minds 
to experience things presently, it does not make sense to attribute presenthood to 
any event or object. Of course, human minds are not the only thing required for there 
to be a present. Any minds capable of some awareness of their mental states, ei-
ther human or non-human, alien or divine, count towards that purpose. Without any 
minds, there is no temporality. Time is ideal, as some authors (some of them eter-
nalists) have already presumed (cf. Kant 1781/87; Gödel 1949, 22 Yourgrau 1991, etc.). 
Why would it be surprising that a model such as MST, which is eternalist, could be ide-
al when eternalists seem sympathetic to the idealism of time?
We should consider another hypothesis: perhaps the present is ideal – and it 
is a dependable aspect that depends on our minds and 
conscience – but the passage of time is an independent 
feature of the world. We argue that this seems possible, 
but that the result would be very different: the spotlight 
does not guarantee the passage of time anymore, be-
cause it is not a mind-depend phenomenon, at least in our model. However, we think 
that some points of tension might arise here: for example, the change of the pres-
ent is purely mental, but the changes in time are not? That sounds less satisfactory. 
Additionally, we find it difficult to explain, within an eternalist ontology, the kind of 
change that could act as a passage of the time. Nevertheless, this is precisely the point 
of obtaining a clear notion on the spotlight metaphor: the ability to indicate some-
thing to explain of what consists the present and the passage of the time itself. 
III.4. It Is a MST, Really? Two Objections by Wilson (2018)
The version we present is related to that recently presented by Skow, called MST-
Time (2015). MST-Time, in turn, has a manifest inspiration: Kit Fine’s fragmentalism 
(2005). According to the author, that version of the model gives us not a unique pres-
ent, but many objective presents: «(4) Each time is present relative to itself, and only 
to itself» (Skow 2015, 58). According to fragmentalism, the world is essentially di-
vided, or, to put it another way, fragmented. The reality is constituted by different 
«fragments» not forming a complete and consistent «whole» (Fine 2005, 281). The 
maximal collections of tensed facts are fragments, and each fragment is internally 
coherent, but the whole of reality (all fragmented facts) is not: the legitimate per-
spectives on some phenomena correspond to their ultimate reality. The world is, af-
ter all, perspectival in that sense, without a division between the perspectival and the 
real. Our perspective on the property of being present indicates what the present is, 
and not a perspectival present. That is, in the end, the appropriation of Fine’s thesis 
by Skow, which we also incorporate in answering our question. All we do is attrib-
ute to the spotlight the same character, indicating it as something undeniably frag-
mented: the aware or self-aware nature of our mental states. However, how plausible 
is Skow’s version? We shall see whether or not some of the difficulties of MST-Time 
22 According to Gödel (1949), 
McTaggart (1908) should 





























































apply to our effort to conceptualise MST as an idealist model.
The classic objection consists of denying a possible exemplification of 
Broad’s model, which is present in Skow’s thesis. That objection presents reasons to 
refuse attribution to Skow’s model of the presence of elements, which differentiates 
it from a classic stationary block universe. Since the model initiated by Broad marks 
differences for any block universe, Skow’s model would be wrongly categorised, i.e., it 
is, at best, a variant of the block universe, but not a new version of MST.
The answer to that objection is simple: despite our presentation of a ver-
sion inspired by Fine and Skow, compatible with the theses of both, the difficulties of 
Skow’s model are not repeated in our case. We can effectively provide a reason to dif-
ferentiate our model from a classic block universe: our awareness of our mental states 
is not stationary, acting as a true moving spotlight. More specifically, our conscious 
mental states occur only in the present, but it is dynamic, and it moves over all physi-
cally caused mental states. It is not clear that, in classic eternalism, we must separate, 
somehow, present mental states from non-present ones. It is not clear that we can 
accommodate the dynamic of our consciousness to the classic model. Some authors 
have noted precisely that: no matter how much the world is declared tenseless, at 
least our mind must have a teased characteristic (cf. Geach 1972, 306 and McGilvray 
1979, 275-99). The difference between a classic block universe and our model is, thus, 
quite simple. In the first place, in a block universe, time does not pass, and our experi-
ence of time passing is not appropriately explained. In the second place, in our model, 
time passes, the property of being present is subjective, but our experience that time 
passes corresponds to something identifiable and explainable.The second objection 
of the kind, applicable to Skow’s model, but not to ours, says that there is no reason 
why the so-called ‘arrow of time’ must have the orientation it supposedly has. That 
objection is more encompassing. According to the objector, Skow provided no reason 
to locate the movement of the present as successive towards the future. It follows 
from this that Skow’s model is unable to tell whether the world is time symmetri-
cal or asymmetrical, whether we live in a world where time is circular, or whether 
the passage of time occurs in any other possible direction. Wilson calls this the «ob-
jection from mode of motion» (Wilson, 2018). According to the author, «MST-Time 
does not give us any clear sense in which the spotlight moves steadily forwards rath-
er than moving backwards or moving in some other way» (2018, §4). Naturally, with 
MST being an asymmetrically conceived model, in which time runs from the past to 
the present and from the present to the future, that objection presents Skow with 
a delicate problem: it questions its adequate place and categorisation as a plausible 
version for MST. However, that problem does not apply to our version. Motivated by 
clarifying Broad’s metaphor, we ended up answering Wilson’s challenges and created 
a version of Skow’s model that is immune to that criticism. The reason that our mod-
el preserves what is required is simple: our consciousness effectively preserves it and 
possesses the desired dynamic character or orientation. If we are correct, there is no 
static awareness of a mental state. To support this thesis, we shall observe how we 
are aware of a mental state and how our consciousness works. Our consciousness 
seems to flow in a time-oriented manner, and we are aware of different mental states 
one by one, in a dynamic movement. Using the terms with which we have been pos-
ing the question, our awareness of our mental states is dynamic, asymmetrical and 





























































III.5. Where Is the Present and How to Know It?
There is another objection, applicable not only to Skow’s model but to the spotlight in 
general. It argues that the MST must be able to guarantee the indication of the pres-
ent when there is no criterion for such. If we are not presentists and so accept the 
inclusion of non-present events and objects among our ontological commitments, 
we can never guarantee that we truly live in the present. Naturally, we live in the rel-
ative present. Relative to instant t in which we have our mental states, t is present. 
However, we know nothing of the absolute present. A relevant difference between 
the absolute and relative present must be produced, and the fact that we experience 
instant t as present does not confer upon us the discriminating power we seek.
A similar question was applied to the growing block model, the one that 
Broad renounced in 1923. Braddon-Mitchell (2004) tells us that there is no way, in 
that model, of distinguishing the absolute present from any other past time (a rel-
ative present). The author is correct, but that problem does not apply to our case. It 
is true because the present is the property that our consciousness attributes to the 
facts and events we experience. We know that we are living in the present because 
the present is, by definition, the time when we have conscious experiences of our 
mental states. According to our thesis, having conscious mental states is a legitimate 
condition for there to be a present. The result resembles Forrest’s (2004) model for 
the Growing Block Theorists, sometimes called «the dead past view», according to 
which the past is dead aside from the fact that it exists. It is dead because no one lives 
in the past, since no one has a phenomenological life there. Of course, since our mod-
el is not a version of a Growing Block, we should have a very similar point about the 
future: the future is dead in the same sense, at least for now.
Note that if what constitutes the passage of time is the dynamic flow of our 
conscience, aware of our experiences only into the present, it is what constitutes the 
present as well. So, time would be an aspect of our mental life, and the flow of time 
could be explained with a phenomenological approach. We can use the awareness of 
our mental states, which is a dynamic process, to explain the use of the metaphor 
for a transient and constant spotlight that has a direction. Indeed, the spotlight does 
not just have a direction, but the direction is what we need to describe the MST! We 
have in this model a non-standard A-series theory but one that preserves what we 
need: the dynamic aspect of the flow of time, the special feature of the present, when 
we compare it with past or future, an eternalist ontology, an objective present, and, 
in some sense, an absolute one (in the sense that the present is identifiable, and we 
could even agree about where it is). This discussion brings us to a further objection 
put forward by Braddon-Mitchell.
III.6. There are Zombies Everywhere?
The author, Braddon-Mitchell, will have realised that the answer to our previous ques-
tion rested on the temporal status of consciousness. He tells us, in an attempt to over-
come the difficulties he raised:
Suppose that the hyperplane that is the objective present is the only one that contains con-
sciousness. Some hold that consciousness is some by-product of the causal frisson that takes 
place on the borders of being and non-being. If this were the case it would restore our con-
fidence that the current moment was the present, because it would become a priori in the 





























































the current location in space-time was in the present, since as soon as that location in space-
time was past, its occupants will be Zombies and thus we would have no awareness. (Braddon-
Mitchell 2004, 202)
He considered so the costs of the thesis we enunciate to be too high. A version of his 
objection can be explained in the following terms. Assuming special relativity, we 
must equally relativise the answer to the question ‘what things, besides us, are in the 
present?’ Even assuming that we are in the objective present, we are still, according 
to special relativity, the occupier of several hyperplanes of simultaneity, each exhibit-
ing different perspectives on the world. The things that now depend on perspectives 
are exhibited in different planes of simultaneity. This being so, even if we are in the 
present, we cannot guarantee that we have before us present objects. As if that was 
not strange enough, we cannot be sure that the people with whom we converse are 
not zombies, living in other times. That, if not absurd and unacceptable, has quite a 
high acceptance cost, thus making the theory unappealing.That is a sensible problem. 
None of us would accept the strange conclusion that seems to follow from that rea-
soning (as if our theories were not strange enough already). Neither can we avoid the 
questions concerning special relativity, since adapting to that theory, without artifice, 
is a reason that generally favours non-presentists. How could we deal with that? Our 
suggestion: we must guarantee that there is a certain coincidence between count-
less subjective presents, and so on, for all conscious people with whom we may inter-
act. In other words, we must guarantee that our presents are sufficiently coincident, 
i.e., all must have conscious mental states only now at this moment at which we are 
writing. However, is that compatible with the relativity of simultaneity? By taking 
relativity as a horizon, we should note that persons are, in the relevant context of 
that theory, objects that have distended temporal parts, what is not promissory for 
us. How can we escape? In terms of simultaneity, Einstein’s thesis can only be accom-
modated with what was said above because people moving at a minimally necessary 
speed for the obtaining of observable relativistic effects is not something actual, or 
even expectable. Of course, if we are in motion relative to an observer or stationary 
relative to a train platform, for instance, there will be a minimal difference between 
what can be indicated in the present of both. However, it will be a near-zero differ-
ence, incapable of being measured by any normal, non-atomic watch.
Moreover, in the absence of anything further, surely the time interval en-
compassing our mental states, of which we are aware, and the reader’s, of which you 
are aware, do not differ significantly. We explain that for practical purposes, it is as if 
we were all in the same systems of coordinates, although we are all performing rela-
tive movements, ones toward the others. This reason is why, essentially, the relativ-
istic effects had remained hidden until the beginning of the last century, when they 
were uncovered by Lorenz’s transformations and then explained officially by Einstein, 
as part of what occurs in the world. If there are, somewhere in the universe, minds 
travelling relatively close to what we consider to be the speed of light, the whole pic-
ture is changed, and then we shall have that undesired scenario, which puzzled us in 
a question inspired by Braddon-Mitchell. Nevertheless, we do not have, as far as we 
know, conflicts between present times, past and future, simply because relative sim-
ultaneity does not apply, in our common experience, to people and their conscious 
mental states.
What perhaps could be claimed is that instants of time and their intervals, 
in both systems of coordinates, will not be the same. However, they will be similar 





























































with his characteristic subtlety, that the present must have an extension that is, in 
fact, impossible to delimitate. Its extension is relative to the interval between the 
events we can perceive presently. For instance, if we snap our fingers, with 0.3 sec-
onds of difference between the sound produced by the fingers of our right hand and 
the sound produced by the fingers of our left hand, we will surely have non-simul-
taneous events. However, both will be perceived by the conscious mind as present 
events. For that reason, unless the relativistic effects are quite evident, under charac-
teristic circumstances familiar to the theory (a speed relatively close to the speed of 
light), there will be no conscious minds that coexist with zombies.
Our scope was, until now, only a way to run a scenario in which we share 
our lives with zombies. However, why do our future or past mental states not con-
figure a zombie’s life when there is no awareness involved? The answer is just that 
no zombies could have a mental life, as we do. To describe this by using the scenar-
io of zombies is a strange way to understand it. Each temporal part of us has the ex-
perience of conscience, and the fact that it happens in a time-ordered flow does not 
transform us into zombies. To show the difference, we claim the following: no zombie 
had or will have an awareness of his mental state for each mental-event in his “life”. 
However, that is our life, according to the theory we are describing.The other prob-
lem – how we know that an object is present – is solved in our proposal with the 
fragmentalism that is inherent to it, in union with our theory about what the present 
is. If fragmentalism is correct, then all objects are present in each of the simultane-
ity planes in which we happen to find ourselves, i.e., they are present only inside the 
fragment. That means that what is present depends only on what we are experienc-
ing. It is true because our awareness of our mental states defines what is present or 
not. It will never be the case, as was described above, that we do not know what to 
say of an event whether or not it is present, for there are no non-present events of 
which we are aware. What makes an object present is that it is part of our present, or, 
better said, it is the coincidence with a conscious mental state what makes an object 
present. The fact that there is no significant and noticeable disagreement concerning 
the intervals of time we are exposed to indicates that the vast majority of objects we 
consider present now also belong to the reader’s relative present. Again, this is what 
we mean when we say that our theory has an objective, though non-unique, present. 
III.7. But What About It Being Deterministic? 
Does the theory contain determinism? I believe that would be a valid criticism, but 
it is not a criticism exclusively directed at our model. According to many authors, 
any eternalist model faces challenges to accommodating free-will, whether they 
are determinist or fatalist (Rietdijk 1966; Putnam 1967; Penrose 1989; Shanks 1994; 
Maxwell 1993, Lockwood 2005). However, we believe our model faces an aggravat-
ing factor: in classic eternalism, we can say that our future choices are conscious, i.e., 
that they are conscious in the future. The composition of the theory would, there-
fore, have inherent in it the idea that we are entirely responsible for our past, present 
and future choices, all of which exist, according to a tenseless ontology. In our model, 
that possibility is discarded. Worse than that, even the choices of which we are now 
aware, in the present, must somehow be previous to our consciousness of them since 
they causally result from temporal parts of our brain that generate real mental states, 
which exist in the tenseless fashion. We become aware of them, in the very precise 
sense of the word, only when we experience them consciously. The problem seems 





























































for a non-determinist philosopher. That is, it would first be necessary to prove that 
determinism is unacceptable and only then reject the model for that reason. Relative 
to free-will, the compatibilist strategies are in order, if true. Since it is not our purpose 
here to defend any of them, it remains an indication that they might be a solution to 
conciliate our model with free-will.
III.8. Is the Spotlight Something Else?
We must compare our answer to two other possible answers. Could the spotlight 
correspond, somehow, to the entropy expressed in the second law of thermodynam-
ics? Could we attribute to God’s conscious mental states some priority, such that the 
absolute present, like a supertime, with which it could be identified? Concerning the 
first question, the answer is quite simple: the passage of time cannot be attributed to 
the second law of thermodynamics in any eternalist model. The reason for this is that 
thermodynamic states, which present a ratio in a clear sense, from order to disorder, 
are like any other state of affairs, in a block universe. There are temporal parts of sys-
tems with patterns of disorder in one direction, all of which are, however, existent. 
Thus, we cannot see how to discriminate the passage of time, which indicates an ab-
solute or relative present, if we accommodate in that model the result of the second 
law of thermodynamics.
Concerning the idea that the present must be identified with the mental 
states of God, we have two things to say. The first is that, if such is the case, then 
our thesis maintains its explanatory power. The answer to the question ‘what cor-
responds to the moving spotlight?’ is ‘the conscious mental states of God, which 
change’. The second thing we should say is that that which can only be said by some-
one who holds that God is a temporal being subject to change, at least in its mental 
states, i.e., beliefs, desires and joys. We suspect, however, that such a thesis will not be 
consensual among eternalist theorists who believe in God, but even if God could have 
changeable mental states, like ours, nothing prevents us from thinking of God’s men-
tal states as conscious now, in the same instant t in which we have consciousness. We 
believe that would be a natural response.
IV. Advantages
The advantages of the model are relative to its capacity to avoid the traditional prob-
lems with MST: namely, McTaggart’s problem and the epistemic problem (Deasy 2015). 
Some authors have indeed provided good answers to those questions, but we easily 
avoid it, i.e., the same problems do not appear in our version of MST. If this is true, we 
do have this advantage. Since McTaggart’s problem suggests a contradiction involving 
the notion of change in things, namely the notion of change in the properties of being 
present, past and future, our version is immune to it. A conscious mental state will 
never be an instance of the McTaggartian contradiction because it will never be pres-
ent and past, past and future, future and present in the same instant. The epistemic 
argument, based on the impossibility of locating the present, also fails. All our con-
scious mental states are present, despite each person having their present. Naturally, 
as we have seen, the many subjective presents coincide, if not completely then at 
least sufficiently, which makes divergences in the size or duration of those same pre-
sents negligible. Many problems are thus avoided, such as Wilson’s (2018) objections 
against adopting Skow’s fragmentalism. Another advantage our model has is its ex-





























































does the moving spotlight effectively correspond? That is an important question, 
based on the need to give substance to a metaphor. Broad, who fathered the model, 
did not think of that metaphor as sufficiently explanatory. We hope to make clearer 
the borderline that separates the present from the non-present and to point out the 
possible changes in how it is drawn. With that, we hope to make MST more attractive, 
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